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Abstract 
 
The ‘deficit model’ of public attitudes towards science has led to controversy over the role of 
scientific knowledge in explaining lay people’s attitudes towards science.  The most 
sustained critique has come from what we refer to as the ‘contextualist’ perspective.  In this 
view, people’s understanding of the ways in which science is embedded within wider political, 
economic and regulatory settings is fundamental for explaining their attitudes towards 
science.  Most work adopting this perspective has relied on qualitative case studies as 
empirical evidence.  In this paper we challenge the de facto orthodoxy that has connected 
the deficit model and contextualist perspectives with quantitative and qualitative research 
methods respectively. We simultaneously test hypotheses from both theoretical approaches 
using quantitative methodology.  We use data from the 1996 British Social Attitudes Survey 
to investigate the interacting effects of different domains of scientific and contextual 
knowledge on public attitudes toward science.  The results point to the clear importance of 
knowledge as a determinant of attitudes toward science. However, in contrast to the rather 
simplistic deficit model that has traditionally characterised discussions of this relationship, 
this analysis highlights the complex and interacting nature of the knowledge-attitude 
interface. 
 
 
 
 
1
Science in Society: Re-evaluating the Deficit Model of Public Attitudes1 
 
THE DEFICIT MODEL AND ITS CRITICS 
The field of study known as ‘public understanding of science’ stands today at 
something of a crossroads (Miller 2001).  In the fifteen years or so since the publication of 
the Bodmer report by the Royal Society (Bodmer 1985), the loose assemblage of 
interdisciplinary approaches that have been applied to the field has produced much in the 
way of practical educational initiatives such as ‘Science, Technology and Engineering Week’ 
in the UK and ‘Project 2061’ in the United States. Many other science popularisation 
initiatives in the UK have been  funded through the Committee for Public Understanding of 
Science (COPUS).  Scholarship has also flourished, with much funding directed at academic 
research into science communication and public attitudes towards science and technology.   
A major aim of COPUS was not only to popularise science, but also to enhance the 
‘scientific literacy’ of the British public.  The Bodmer report was commissioned in the belief 
that the public’s interest in and support for science and scientists was waning. At the same 
time, scientists themselves had retreated from public debate to an alarming degree. The 
report suggested not only that scientists now had a duty to go out and communicate the 
benefits of science to a wider public, but also that a more  ‘scientifically literate’ public would 
be more supportive of scientific research programs and more enthusiastic about 
technological innovations. This would, of course, be a rather happy outcome for the scientific 
research community.  
A scientifically literate citizenry is also one that can effectively participate in public 
debates about science and hold government to account over the speed and direction of 
science policy. From this normative perspective, in modern democratic societies, citizens 
need to have sufficient levels of accurate information on which to base their assessments of 
policy alternatives in order that their policy preferences best reflect their own self or group 
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interests (Converse 1964, Delli-Carpini and Keeter 1996). As scientific and technological 
innovations become increasingly central to the functioning of modern societies and to the 
daily lives of individual citizens, the argument goes, so the importance of technical and 
scientific knowledge within the mass public is concomitantly augmented.  
There is little doubt, however, that one of the primary motives underlying recent 
government and business initiatives to increase public ‘understanding’ of science is what 
Nelkin (1995) calls ‘selling science’  (see for example Office of Science and Technology and 
the Wellcome Trust 2001). Implicit or explicit, in this programmatic agenda is the claim that 
‘to know science is to love it’.  That is to say, the more one knows about science, the more 
favourable one’s attitude towards it will be. Regrettably, from this point of view at least, 
publics both in Europe and in the United States appear to possess depressingly low levels of 
scientific knowledge. Jon Miller conceptualises ‘civic scientific literacy’ as comprising three 
related dimensions:  ‘a vocabulary of basic scientific constructs sufficient to read competing 
views in a newspaper or magazine…an understanding of the process or nature of scientific 
inquiry…some level of understanding of the impact of science and technology on individuals 
and on society’ (Miller 1998). While Miller’s concept is by no means an uncontested one, on 
his definition not more than one quarter of the European and US publics qualify as 
scientifically literate. Moreover, this situation has hardly changed since systematic 
measurements first began in the late 1950s, despite the best efforts of governments and 
educators alike to popularise science and make it more accessible to ordinary citizens during 
the intervening years. Withey (1959) found that In 1957 only about 10 percent of Americans 
correctly defined science as having to do with the concepts of controlled experimentation, 
theory and systematic variation. Fifteen years later, when the U.S. National Science 
Foundation (NSF) initiated its Science Indicators survey series, the proportion was 
unchanged (Gregory and Miller 1998).  In 1988, Durant, Evans and Thomas (1989) reported 
that only 17 percent of the British public spontaneously referred to experimentation and/or 
theory testing when asked the question: ‘what does it mean to study something 
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scientifically?’ When the same question was asked nearly a decade later, in the 1996 British 
Social Attitudes survey (Jowell, Curtice, Park, Brook, Thomson and Bryson 1997), the 
proportion remained statistically unchanged at 18 percent. The picture for what might be 
considered ‘factual’ or ‘textbook’ scientific knowledge is similar.  For instance, Durant, Evans 
and Thomas (1989) report that in 1988 only 34 percent of the British public knew that the 
earth goes around the sun once a year and only 28 percent knew that antibiotics kill bacteria 
but not viruses (see appendix for more factual knowledge questions from this survey). In the 
USA, respondents faced with the same questions fared similarly to their British counterparts, 
with 46 and 25 percent providing the correct answer respectively. 
Against this backdrop of widespread scientific ‘ignorance’ amongst lay publics, there 
has been, over the past few decades, rising public scepticism about the benefits of scientific 
and technological innovation and a diminishing conviction that scientific progress is 
coterminous with social progress (Hargreaves 2000, Touraine 1985).  In Britain, this view 
motivated a major public inquiry into the relationship between science and society by the 
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (2000) which suggested that 
‘society's relationship with science is in a critical phase’ characterised by ‘public unease, 
mistrust and occasional outright hostility’.  Unease of this kind has been evident in public 
controversies a number of years, concerning, for example, the real and potential dangers of 
DDT in the early 1960s, nuclear power in the 1970s and 1980s and, more recently, crises in 
public confidence in farming and food technologies following the BSE scandal in Britain in the 
1990s. Typifying this state of affairs at present is gene technology.  While held out by some 
as promising almost limitless future benefits for society, optimism about these prospects in 
Europe has steadily declined since the beginning of the 1990s (Gaskell, Allum, Wagner, 
Hviid Nielsen, Jelsoe, Kohring and Bauer 2001). The scientific community, along with 
governments and industry, all now recognise that a sufficiently hostile public and media can 
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seriously constrain or even veto a contentious research program (Miller, Pardo and Niwa 
1997). 
The assumption that it is a lack of public understanding or knowledge that has led to 
the present climate of scepticism toward science underpins what has come to be known as 
the ‘deficit model’ (Layton, Jenkins, McGill and Davey 1993, Wynne 1991, Ziman 1991). In 
this formulation, it is the public that are assumed to be ‘deficient’, while science is ‘sufficient’ 
(Gross 1994).  The public’s doubts about the value of scientific progress or fears about new 
or unfamiliar innovations, such as genetically modified organisms or microwave ovens, are 
due to ignorance of the science behind them. Lacking a proper understanding of the relevant 
facts, people fall back on mystical beliefs and irrational fears of the unknown. If one accepts 
this hypothesis, the obvious implication for science policy is that public information 
campaigns should be instigated to remedy the public’s disenchantment with science. Whilst 
the deficit model, as we shall refer to it here, is to some extent a simplification, or even 
something of a ‘straw man’, it quite evidently underlies many programmatic statements from 
the scientific community when the misplaced fears of a scientifically illiterate public and mass 
media are bemoaned (Evans and Durant 1995). And the simple logic of the deficit model is 
supported by a good deal of cross-national empirical evidence for a robust but not especially 
strong positive correlation between ‘textbook’ scientific knowledge and favourability of 
attitude toward science (e.g. Bauer, Durant and Evans 1994, Evans and Durant 1995, 
Gaskell, Allum, Wagner, Hviid Nielsen, Jelsoe, Kohring and Bauer 2001, Grimston 1994, 
McBeth and Oakes 1996, Miller, Pardo and Niwa 1997, Sturgis and Allum 2000, Sturgis and 
Allum 2001).  
Unsurprisingly, given its normative and epistemological implications, the deficit model 
has come in for sustained criticism on a number of grounds.  Firstly, the assumption that so-
called ‘irrational’ fears of lay publics are based on lack of scientific understanding has been 
strongly challenged by a number of commentators.  Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), for 
example, have argued that people’s fears about new technologies are functional in that they 
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provide a basis for maintaining cultural associations.  In other words, people select risks to 
worry about according to the norms of their social milieu rather than responding to 
supposedly more ‘objective’ hazards.  Others have shown that perceptions of technological 
risks are related to certain types of worldview (Slovic and Peters 1998) or the holding of 
certain core beliefs and values such as environmentalism. In none of these conceptions is 
the perception of risk dependent primarily on one’s level of scientific understanding. 
Another criticism of the deficit model and the way in which it has been approached via 
quantitative survey research focuses on the selection of appropriate measures of scientific 
understanding (Hayes and Tariq 2000, Peters 2000). The argument is made that proponents 
and opponents in scientific controversies are likely to select different domains of knowledge 
as being relevant or important (Peters 2000). The normative assumptions behind the 
selection and development of knowledge measures such as those of Withey, Miller, Evans 
and Durant may not necessarily correspond with those of all protagonists in any given 
scientific controversy.  Peters (2000), for example, criticises some of the knowledge 
measures used in the 1992 Eurobarometer survey (INRA 1993) as being based on a 
‘culturally determined idealisation’ of what should constitute scientific knowledge.  As a 
result, he argues, the measures present a biased indication of the relative levels of relevant 
scientific understanding that is dependent on respondents’ national and cultural locations. 
Another recent current of criticism of the deficit model suggests that the effect of scientific 
knowledge is far outweighed by the influence of social trust on people’s perceptions of new 
and potentially risky technologies (Priest 2001, Priest 2001, Siegrist, Cvetkovich and Roth 
2000). 
While these criticisms are undoubtedly in many ways valid, they do not, in our view, 
sufficiently problematise the deficit model to justify scrapping it entirely.  Indeed, we find it 
puzzling that many scholars utilising survey research methods that consistently uncover 
associations between knowledge of and attitudes towards science, despite controlling for a 
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range of other important characteristics such as age, education and social class, often 
choose to ignore this finding and instead emphasise the other factors that are also influential 
in the formation of attitudes (Hayes and Tariq 2000, Hayes and Tariq 2001, Priest 2001, 
Sturgis and Allum 2001). It is quite clear that culture, economic factors, social and political 
values and worldviews are all important in determining the public’s attitude towards science.  
There is, however, no reason to assume in consequence that scientific knowledge does not 
have an additional and independent influence, for reasons that are thus far not clearly 
understood.  In fact there is ample reason to consider it quite implausible that the well-
informed and poorly informed citizen go about the business of making up their minds in the 
same way (Sniderman, Glaser and Griffin 1990).    
 
THE CONTEXTUALIST PERSPECTIVE 
A more trenchant critique is one which suggests the existence of other knowledge 
domains that influence attitudes towards science and technology in opposite or conflicting 
ways to factual scientific knowledge. Jasanoff, for example, suggests that what is important 
for people’s understanding of science is not so much the ability to recall large numbers of 
miscellaneous facts but rather ‘a keen appreciation of the places where science and 
technology articulate smoothly with one’s experience of life…and of the trustworthiness of 
expert claims and institutions’ (Jasanoff 2000).  Brian Wynne, an incisive critic of the deficit 
model of PUS, delineates this position further. Criticising survey-based PUS research’s over-
reliance on simple ‘textbook’ knowledge scales, he suggests that in order to properly capture 
the range of knowledge domains relevant to lay attitudes towards scientific research 
programmes ‘three elements of public understanding have to be expressly related: the formal 
contents of scientific knowledge; the methods and processes of science; and its forms of 
institutional embedding, patronage, organisation and control’ (Wynne 1992) 
Clearly the implication of what we shall here refer to as the ‘contextualist’2 position is 
that the deficit model considers only the first two of these elements and that, in neglecting the 
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different forms of engagement that individuals and groups might have with science in a 
variety of contexts, PUS research has overstated the importance of the simple linear deficit 
model.  Other knowledges - be it intimate knowledge of working procedures at a nuclear 
power plant or awareness of the practical political interdependencies between government, 
industry and scientific institutions - will always be moderating factors. The ways in which 
people utilise their factual scientific knowledge is contextualised by the circumstances under 
consideration.  As a corollary to this line of argument we can assume that the third element in 
this formulation will influence public attitudes in ways opposite to or conflicting with the first 
two elements. If not, then it would appear to be nothing other than a somewhat more 
elaborated restatement of the deficit model.   
In this vein, Steven Yearley highlights public trust in scientific expertise as a key 
factor in the contextualisation of knowledge of science (Yearley 2000).  Trust in expert 
claims, he argues, is always mediated by knowledge of the institutional arrangements under 
which expertise is authorised. Claims to expert knowledge are always contestable depending 
on what one knows of the relevant institutions.  For instance, claims made by government 
experts may be evaluated differently to those made by scientists employed by non-
governmental organisations.  At this point, trust becomes the issue.  Of course, in making 
these evaluations, other psychological and social factors come into play: political ideology, 
personal interests and preferences.  Nevertheless, all things being equal, some form of 
‘institutional knowledge’ will serve in this example to contextualise ‘factual’ scientific 
knowledge and knowledge of scientific methods when people evaluate the science under 
consideration.   
Wynne and others who have been instrumental in the articulation of the contextualist 
perspective have argued that a survey-based, quantitative approach cannot shed any useful 
light on this or other contextualising forms of knowledge.  In fact, it would not be an 
exaggeration to say that one of the central axioms of this perspective seems to be that 
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survey-based methods are at best procrustean and at worst fundamentally misleading for 
understanding lay publics’ knowledge of and interactions with science (Wynne 1995). The 
principal contention is that ‘surveys take the respondent out of [their] social context and are 
intrinsically unable to examine or control analytically for the potentially variable, socially 
rooted meanings that key terms have for social actors’ (Wynne 1995).  Methodologically, the 
contextualist perspective has relied instead on qualitative case studies for empirical support 
(e.g. Irwin and Wynne 1996, Kerr, Cunningham-Burley and Amos 1998, Michael 1992, 
Michael 1996). A contextualist theoretical outlook and a quantitative methodological 
approach are, apparently, incommensurable from this perspective.  
This conflation of theory and method - with contextualist perspectives requiring an 
ideographic/qualitative approach and quantitative/survey based research seen as good only 
for propounding the deficit model – is, we believe, both an unnecessary and an unhelpful 
state of affairs. As Einsiedel astutely remarks: ‘Contrasting [the deficit model] with the 
interactive science model3 may have analytical value, but one thereby tends to emphasise 
the stark differences between the two and to overlook the possibility that these frameworks 
may be complementary rather than mutually exclusive’ (Einsiedel 2000). Furthermore, the 
idea that survey based analyses are not capable of or suitable for demonstrating a 
contingent or mediated relationship between knowledge and attitude does not bear close 
scrutiny. Evans and Durant (1995), for example, show that while the simple deficit model 
holds for attitudes to science in general, better informed respondents tend to be among the 
most sceptical when it comes to ‘morally contentious’ and ‘non-useful’ sciences.  Similarly, 
Bauer, Evans and Durant (1994), in another multi-variate statistical analysis, show that the 
strength of the knowledge-attitude relationship varies across Europe according to national 
levels of economic advancement.  However, while these studies demonstrate, through 
quantitative analysis, the contingent nature of the knowledge attitude nexus, they do not 
focus specifically on the mediational or contextualising form of knowledge as set out, 
however imprecisely, by those propounding this theoretical model. 
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 The present research is motivated by a concern to address this gap in the empirical 
literature; we believe that potentially valuable theoretical insights and developments in the 
field of public understanding of science are being stymied by the paradigmatic formalisms 
and methodological orthodoxies of divergent research traditions. Rather than seeing the 
contextualist perspective as a potentially decisive critique of the deficit model, we hope in this 
paper to show how these two theoretical perspectives might be integrated in a more complex 
and complete account of how what people know about science and the context in which it is 
practised affects their general favourability toward science and the scientific community. In 
using a quantitative, survey based approach as the vehicle in this regard, we do not aim to 
pick it out as the methodological ‘royal road’, but, rather, aim to illustrate how both the deficit 
and contextualist models might be investigated from this particular perspective. 
 
MEASURING CONTEXTUAL KNOWLEDGE 
The key problem, of course, in integrating the contextualist perspective within a 
survey based quantitative analysis is obtaining satisfactory operationalisations of the relevant 
knowledge domains. Finding adequate indicators of hypothetical and unobservable concepts 
is difficult at the best of times (Hox, 1997). The process is at its most treacherous when, as in 
the current instance, the concepts in question are ‘fuzzy’, multi-dimensional and, to a large 
degree, contested. However, the potentiality of biased or unreliable measurement should not, 
we would argue, lead us to abandon the idea that there might be something of interest to be 
measured. Rather, the question that needs to be addressed is: how can we obtain the best 
measurements?   
The notion of contextualising knowledge is not, to be sure, a domain of specified and 
particular content in and of itself. Rather, it expresses the idea of an interacting causal 
mechanism between two or more independent variables and an unspecified dependent 
variable. Earlier we briefly reviewed some of the definitions and examples that proponents of 
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the contextualist perspective have suggested might constitute knowledge domains that act in 
such a way in combination with factual scientific knowledge and attitudes toward science. We 
would summarise these as falling into either of two main categories: ‘institutional knowledge 
of science’ denoting an understanding of the ways in which science is embedded within 
wider political, economic and regulatory settings and ‘local knowledge’ which we take to 
mean knowledge of the ways in which specific applications of science or technology connect 
with everyday practices in particular contexts. As we are here focusing on the national 
picture, using data that is representative of the GB population rather than any specific 
localities, we focus our attention on the former of these. There is, however, no reason why 
the analytical approach we adopt here could not equally well be applied to small area data if 
an appropriate measure of the relevant ‘local knowledge’ in question were available. 
So how does one go about measuring the average citizen’s knowledge of the political 
and institutional relationships in which science and the development of science policy and 
regulation is embedded? Well, here we propose that the answer truly is in the question. For 
what we are surely dealing with here is a kind of ‘political sophistication’ – a concept which 
has undergone a great deal of theoretical and empirical scrutiny in the field of political 
science over the last thirty or so years (Luskin 1987). This programme of research has 
repeatedly demonstrated that, firstly, individual citizens vary enormously in the amount they 
know about politics and that, secondly, one’s level of political knowledge has a significant 
impact on one’s political preferences, likelihood of voting and a whole host of other important 
behaviours, attitudes and beliefs (Converse 2000, Delli-Carpini and Keeter 1996). What it 
has also shown is that, as with most areas of knowledge or intelligence, in politics people 
tend to be ‘generalists’, such that their level of knowledge in any one particular domain will 
be highly predictive of their level of knowledge in another. So people who know the names 
and faces of political ‘actors’ also tend to know about the institutions of government and 
where parties and candidates stand on the major issues of the day.  For example, Delli 
Carpini and Keeter have shown that, in two recent US surveys, the average correlation 
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between scales measuring knowledge about political ‘players’ and the policy stances of 
political parties is approximately .80.  They also find that, in a range of US surveys, the 
lowest correlation between sub-domains of political knowledge (drawn from a pool of ten 
different domains) is as high as .52, while the greatest is .97. 
Based on results like these, we would argue that if we can distinguish between 
individuals in terms of their level of political knowledge, such a measure is also likely to be 
discriminative of the extent to which people are aware of the political and institutional 
relationships within which the practice and regulation of science and technology is located. 
Let us not forget, after all, that the ways in which science is practised, regulated and 
deployed in society is still essentially a ‘political’ matter. 
So while political knowledge batteries - as routinely implemented in surveys of 
political attitudes and behaviour - are clearly not direct measures of the ‘institutional 
knowledge of science’ construct as set out above, we believe that they will likely act as 
reasonably good proxies: people who are knowledgeable about political parties and the issue 
positions they endorse, are also more likely to be familiar with existing forms of scientific 
regulation, government committee structures, the nature of links between science, industry 
and government and so forth.   
An additional reason for preferring this particular operationalisation in the analysis is 
the difficulty of obtaining purely factual ‘answers’ to any questions that might otherwise be 
used as indicators.  Bauer, Petkova and Boyadjieva (2000) have developed a set of items 
designed to measure what they also term ‘institutional knowledge of science’. They found 
that ‘institutional knowledge’ comprises two sub-domains of belief about a) the autonomy of 
scientists and b) the ways in which institutions function. However, they themselves 
acknowledge the potential pitfalls of trying to directly assess this type of knowledge by 
pointing to what they the see as the inherently contested nature of ‘facts’ about institutions. 
As a result, the problem with Bauer et al.’s scale is that too many of the items, in the absence 
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of any objective means of determining the ‘correct’ response, stray from the knowledge into 
the attitudinal domain4. As we are here primarily interested in how different domains of 
knowledge impact on attitude toward science, we feel that it is of paramount importance to 
employ measures of knowledge that have, without descending into solipsism, easily 
verifiable right or wrong answers. It is therefore, we believe, preferable to use a less direct 
but verifiably a knowledge based measure of our key theoretical construct than a more direct 
but also a more ambiguous and contestable one. 
 
ANALYSIS 
From the discussion above it is possible to deduce a number of empirical hypotheses 
concerning the relationship between the favourability of people’s attitudes toward science 
and their level of political and scientific sophistication. These are tested on data from a 
survey of a representative sample of the British population. Firstly, then, the deficit model 
holds that a generally negative attitude toward science is underpinned by, inter alia, a lack of 
‘textbook’ scientific knowledge.  Our first hypothesis therefore becomes: 
 
H1 – The main effect of scientific knowledge on general attitude toward science – 
controlling for a range of important demographic characteristics - will be significant and 
positive. 
 
The contextualist account, on the other hand, contends that understanding of the 
relationships between political and financial institutions and the scientific community is at 
least as important as scientific knowledge and will, in the aggregate, serve to diminish or 
even counteract any simple positive linear relationship between textbook scientific 
knowledge and attitude toward science. Our second hypothesis is therefore: 
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H2 – The main effect of political knowledge on general attitude toward science – 
controlling for a range of important demographic characteristics and scientific knowledge - 
will be significant and negative. 
 
If the contextualist account is correct, we would also expect that political knowledge 
will act to moderate the effect of scientific knowledge in the formation of attitudes.  In other 
words, for people with a lot of knowledge about politics and institutional decision-making, 
scientific knowledge will not be related to attitudes in the same way as it is for those without 
much political awareness.  Accordingly, our third hypothesis is: 
 
H3 – The effect of scientific knowledge on attitude toward science will vary as a 
function of level of political knowledge. 
 
Finally, the contextualist account sees contextual knowledge as a kind of ‘protective 
filter’, endowing us with an important scepticism concerning the aims, objectivity and 
independence of the scientific community. Thus, while we might expect to see a strong 
correlation between textbook scientific knowledge and acceptance of science for those less 
knowledgeable in this domain, any such relationship should also steadily diminish as the 
stock of political knowledge increases. Our fourth hypothesis (conditional on non-rejection of 
H3) therefore becomes: 
 
H3b - the positive effect of scientific knowledge on attitude toward science will be 
greatest at low levels of political knowledge and will be much diminished at higher levels of 
political knowledge. 
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These hypotheses are tested using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression on a 
scale measuring favourability of attitude toward science and applications of scientific 
knowledge. Data come from the 1996 British Social Attitudes Survey (Jowell, Curtice, Park, 
Brook, Thomson and Bryson 1997) that contains the necessary measures of all key 
variables.5 The dependent variable is an additive scale comprising four five-point Likert items 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.53) 6 that measure a general attitude toward science and the benefits 
of technological innovation. These questions have been included in a number of previous 
surveys and have been used to create a measure of general attitude toward science in a 
number of studies (Bauer, Durant and Evans 1994, Evans and Durant 1995, Miller, Pardo 
and Niwa 1997, Pardo and Calvo 2002). Exact wordings for these items are provided in the 
appendix.  Raw scores on the summed scale have a possible range of zero to sixteen as the 
individual items were all coded zero (least favourable) to four (most favourable). To facilitate 
interpretation and comparability with the other key variables in the analysis, the raw scores 
were converted into percentiles, representing the percentage of respondents at each value of 
the raw scale. Respondents at a particular level of the scale were assigned the mid-point of 
the set of percentiles covered by that particular value. Thus, for example, 0.2 per cent of 
respondents had the lowest score on the raw summed scale. These respondents were 
assigned a percentile score of 0.001, representing the mid-point of this set of percentiles on 
a zero to one scale. Higher scores on this scale therefore indicate a more favourable attitude 
toward science.  A histogram of the raw scale score is presented in the appendix. 
As a measure of scientific knowledge we use a ten-item subset of the scale originally 
developed by Durant, Evans and Thomas (1989) that subsequently became known as the 
‘Oxford’ scale of scientific knowledge. The subscale used here (range = 0-10) taps a range of 
areas of scientific knowledge (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.68). These include; understanding of 
probability theory; understanding of the nature of scientific enquiry; understanding of 
experimental design and control groups; and a number of areas of ‘textbook’ scientific 
knowledge. Raw scale scores were also converted to a percentile measure as outlined 
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above. Exact wordings for these items and details of codings of correct/incorrect responses 
are provided in the appendix.  
For our measure of political knowledge, we use a six-item scale tapping respondent 
knowledge of the policy stances of the main political parties in Great Britain (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = 0.66). Raw scores ranged from zero to six and were also converted to a percentile 
measure to ease interpretation and comparability. Exact wordings and coding schemes are 
provided in the appendix.  
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 shows the results of three OLS regression models predicting general attitude 
toward science. Predictors in the models are political affiliation; age; sex; religiosity; social 
class; scientific qualifications; general educational attainment; marital status; and 
employment status. Political knowledge, scientific knowledge and their interaction are 
incorporated in the models in iterative steps. The results of Model 1 clearly support H1, with 
a positive and highly significant coefficient of 0.286 (p<0.001) for scientific knowledge, even 
in the presence of other important determinants of general attitude toward science. Note also 
that the majority of other independent variables in the model are significant at the p < 0.05 
level or lower and in the expected direction – being male, younger, non-religious, right wing, 
having scientific qualifications and being in a non-manual social-class are all positively 
associated with a more favourable attitude toward science. 
Model 2 incorporates all the independent variables in Model 1 but this time adds 
political knowledge as a predictor in the model. The significant and positive main effect of 
political knowledge does not support H2 but in fact shows that the opposite of H2 pertains – 
greater levels of political knowledge also lead to a more favourable attitude toward science. 
This finding would appear to be at odds with the contextualist perspective. For the 
contextualist critique of the deficit model argues that it provides an overly simple, holistic 
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account of the knowledge-attitude relationship and that considering other domains of 
knowledge such as ‘institutional knowledge of science’ as determinants of attitude would 
show a reversal of the positive association commonly found between ‘textbook’ scientific 
knowledge and attitude toward science.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Our interpretation here depends crucially, of course, on acceptance of the political 
knowledge measure acting as a reasonable proxy for the ‘institutional knowledge of science’ 
domain described by contextualist accounts – a point which we consider at greater length 
below. Note also that the R2 increases significantly and that the coefficients for the other 
independent variables are not much affected as a result of the inclusion of political 
knowledge in the model. The biggest change is in the negative coefficient for sex (female) 
indicating that at least some of the negative attitude toward science amongst women may be 
due to the difference in levels of political knowledge between the sexes. 
Model 3 further elaborates on Models 1 and 2 by including the interaction of political 
and scientific knowledge as an additional predictor of attitude toward science. What the 
significant interaction parameter in Model 3 shows then, is that there is indeed a 
contextualising or moderating effect of political knowledge on the relationship between 
textbook scientific knowledge and attitude toward science, supporting hypothesis H3. 
Someone with the lowest level of political knowledge (zero) and the lowest level of scientific 
knowledge (zero) would have a predicted score of .49 (the intercept) on the attitude toward 
science variable (that is to say they would be on the 49th percentile of the attitude variable). If 
someone has the lowest score on the political knowledge measure, a one unit increase in 
scientific knowledge would lead to a .18 increase in attitude toward science. If someone has 
the lowest score on the scientific knowledge score, however, a one unit increase in political 
knowledge would lead to only a .008 increase in attitude toward science. The positive 
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coefficient for the interaction of political and scientific knowledge indicates that, for every one 
unit increase in political knowledge, the slope of attitude toward science on scientific 
knowledge increases by 0.16 or, equivalently, for every one unit increase in scientific 
knowledge, the slope of attitude toward science on political knowledge increases by 0.16. 
Thus, at all levels of scientific knowledge, the effect of growth in political knowledge is to 
further enhance the already favourable attitude. This is counter to what the contextualist 
model would predict as specified in hypothesis H3b. The same ‘amplification’ effect applies 
equally to scientific knowledge, which maintains a positive slope on attitude toward science 
at all levels of political knowledge - with the largest coefficients appearing at higher levels of 
political knowledge.  
The nature of this interacting effect between political and scientific knowledge on 
attitude toward science can be represented in three dimensional space by taking the 
predicted score on the attitude dependent variable from Model 3 at each combination of 
levels of the other two variables as shown in Figure 1.7 Figure 1 clearly illustrates the 
curvilinear relationship between each knowledge domain and attitude toward science. Note 
how the regression plane always moves in an upward direction on the Z axis with increases 
in scientific or political knowledge. The group most favourable toward science are those at 
the top percentile of both knowledge dimensions, while the least favourable are those with 
the lowest score on political knowledge and the minimum on the scientific knowledge scales. 
For those at the highest level of political knowledge, moving from the bottom to the top of the 
scientific knowledge scale alone results in a increase in favourability of attitude toward 
science of almost thirty percentiles. This compares with a more modest jump of around 
seventeen percentiles for the same increase in scientific knowledge amongst those at the 
lowest level of political knowledge 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
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This then appears to be the reverse of what the contextualist account would lead us 
to expect – rather than political knowledge acting to attenuate the positive effect of ‘textbook’ 
scientific knowledge on attitude toward science, it actually appears to amplify the existing 
positive association. Furthermore, of the two domains, scientific knowledge appears to be far 
the stronger determinant of attitude toward science. The largest increase in favourability of 
attitude caused by increasing political knowledge is 14 per cent while the equivalent figure for 
scientific knowledge is more than double that amount. This can be seen from the fact that the 
angle of elevation of the regression plane in Figure 1 is more oblique from left  to right than it 
is from front to back. 
 
DISCUSSION 
We have tried in this paper to show how the contextualist and deficit perspectives in public 
understanding of science might be integrated within a survey-based quantitative analysis. In 
doing so we hope to open up a more open and fruitful dialogue between researchers in the 
field who come, perhaps, from different methodological and epistemological research 
traditions. Too often methodological formalism and theoretical orthodoxy seems to prevent 
the useful cross-fertilisation of ideas and stifles the progression and refinement of theory. To 
be sure, we recognise that there are a number of problems and limitations in our approach 
and do not claim that the conclusions we draw concerning the complex relationship between 
different domains of knowledge and attitude toward science are definitive. Nonetheless, 
many of the caveats we ourselves would place on these results derive from circumstances 
beyond our control; we have had, for example, to rely on analysis of secondary data and, to 
that extent, have not been able to develop our own operationalisations of key constructs in 
our theoretical models. For this reason we hope that readers will see this analysis as a 
position piece to be elaborated and improved upon in the future.  
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We anticipate two primary lines of objection to our analysis and the conclusions we 
have drawn from it. To those who contend that these sorts of questions are simply not 
amenable to a quantitative, survey-based approach, we have little to say in reply8. It is not 
the aim of this paper to counter a generalised scepticism of the survey method (indeed any 
sceptics reading this paper are more likely to have had their prejudices confirmed) but to 
show how these two important theoretical perspectives might be integrated within a single 
methodological study. More forceful criticism will concern the operationalisations of our key 
theoretical constructs: ‘general attitude toward science’, ‘textbook knowledge of science’ and 
‘institutional knowledge of science’, to which we turn below. 
We are aware that the use of such a generalised measure of attitude toward science 
raises issues of the exact meaning of such an abstract construct and whether our results 
can, in any way, be expected to apply to more concrete and localised contexts. One does, of 
course, need to be extremely careful when interpreting general attitudes and their 
relationship to more specific opinions and behaviours (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980).  
Nevertheless, we believe that an overall evaluation of science as measured here is 
diagnostic of a wider set of attitudes, values and beliefs reflecting a person’s disposition 
towards the social integration of technological innovation and ‘scientific progress’ and concur 
with Evans and Durant who argue that such a construct has real social force and meaning in 
that it represents evaluations of science as “a set of principles, a way of understanding the 
world, or as a profession’ (Evans and Durant 1995).  
As regards our measures of scientific and political knowledge, we accept that 
knowing the answers to these items in isolation cannot be conceived of as very interesting or 
useful for understanding someone’s attitude toward science in society.  How can knowledge 
or ignorance of a set of true/false questions in a survey tell us anything of any value about 
someone’s real understanding of science or politics? This line of criticism, however, 
fundamentally misses the point of measurement using diagnostic indicators. For, as we have 
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already pointed out, there is good evidence to suggest that people do not tend to learn things 
in isolation (Evans and Durant 1995, Gaziano and Gaziano 1996, Miller 1983, Miller 1998, 
Popkin and Dimock 1999, Tichenor, Donohue and Olien 1970).  It is likely, for example, that 
a person who obtains a high score on this particular science quiz also has a range of other 
relevant scientific knowledge and understanding that, taken together, influence the formation 
of their attitude toward science. Confusing the contents of the measurement instrument with 
the attitude or trait underlying responses to it is a common mistake among critics of 
quantitative approaches to PUS. But, as Philip Converse has remarked, ‘it does not take 
much imagination to realise that knowledge of minor facts…are diagnostic of more profound 
differences in the amount of contextual information citizens bring to their judgments’ 
(Converse 2000). The items selected for this analysis should accordingly be seen as 
diagnostic indicators rather than fully constitutive of the actual scientific and political 
knowledge relevant to attitude formation.    
One need not disagree with our position here, however, to argue that our measure of 
political knowledge is not tapping the kind of awareness of ‘patronage, organisation and 
control’ that is stressed within the contextualist treatment of ‘institutional knowledge of 
science’. While acknowledging the need for further work and replication for delineating the 
measurement properties of this construct, we believe that we have summoned ample 
evidence pointing to the validity and reliability of such measures in general. And, furthermore, 
there is no particular reason why awareness of science and technology policy and regulation 
should not be among the other political issues, knowledge of which is known to correlate with 
these sorts of items. Finally, if it could be shown that the type of policy related political 
knowledge that we have used here has, in fact, little to do with the type of ‘institutional-
relational’ knowledge that we are attempting to tap, it begs the question of why this type of 
political knowledge is related to the formation of attitudes towards science in the way we 
have shown it to be. 
 
 
 
 
 
21
CONCLUSION 
The results as they stand lend some support to the contextualist perspective, 
although not perhaps in the way we might have expected. The effect of scientific knowledge 
on attitude toward science is not a straightforward linear main effect, but does indeed appear 
to be ‘contextualised’ by at least one other domain of knowledge. This domain, we have 
argued, is that which Wynne (1992) has described as representing an individual’s 
understanding of the ‘patronage, organisation and control’ operating in and around science 
and the scientific community. Contrary to what the contextualist critique of the deficit model 
would lead us to expect, however, the effect of this knowledge domain seems to operate in 
ways similar to ‘textbook’ scientific knowledge, augmenting the already positive influence of 
the latter domain on favourability of attitude toward science. This latter result leads us to 
suggest a possible mechanism underlying these findings.    
Popkin and Dimock (1999) observe that respondents with low levels of political 
knowledge tend to see political scandal as much more serious than those with higher levels 
of political knowledge and understanding. They use Attribution Theory and, in particular, the 
notion of the ‘Fundamental Attribution Error’ (Jones and Nisbett 1971) to explain why this 
might be so. Attribution research has shown that people tend to interpret the behaviour of 
others as indicative of character, while tending to attribute their own behaviour to 
circumstances (Watson 1982). In other words, if a Member of Parliament writes a bounced 
cheque it is because she is untrustworthy; if I write a bounced cheque it is because I was so 
busy that I forgot to first make sure I had sufficient funds. Furthermore, because we also tend 
to overestimate the reasonableness of our own actions, we also overestimate the probability 
that others would do the same as us.  When this is not the case, we tend to attribute the 
difference to ‘bad character’ (Ross and Anderson 1982).  Because a key moderating factor in 
the tendency to make internal attributions is the amount of contextual information available to 
observers, Popkin and Dimock argue that those with more political knowledge better 
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understand the constraints and contexts in which political behaviour takes place. The more 
situations and contexts in which one has observed these actions, the less likely it is that 
behaviour will be attributed to character.   
This, of course, is entering the realms of post-hoc speculation but has, we feel, 
important implications for the interpretation of the findings that we have presented in this 
paper, in addition to highlighting a promising avenue for future research.  The effect of 
scientific knowledge on the attitudes of respondents whose knowledge of politics is high is 
greater than it is for those with low political knowledge.  With a greater degree of political 
understanding and awareness, it may be that people are less likely to attribute the less 
fortunate outcomes of scientific development to the bad character of scientists or politicians 
but to a more complex set of institutional, political and other ‘situational’ factors.  Hence, 
whatever leads knowledge of science to increase one’s favourability towards it, is even more 
effective when people are familiar with the complex range of circumstances surrounding 
scientific and technological development within the wider political landscape.  
In making these observations we are convinced that, firstly, both deficit and 
contextualist perspectives help to explain how, why and under what conditions knowledge of 
many kinds is important in determining public attitudes towards science and, secondly, that 
survey-based approaches are by no means unsuitable for research into public understanding 
of science from a ‘contextualist’ theoretical perspective.   
 
 
Notes 
1 An earlier version of this article was presented at the World Association of Public Opinion 
Research (WAPOR) Annual Conference, Date, Rome, Italy. 
2 We use this term to denote this perspective because, in this view, knowledge of science is 
seen not as an abstract canon of ‘facts’ but as sets of understandings within varying practical 
and social contexts. The effect of one form of understanding on attitude will, in this view, be 
contextualised by other areas of knowledge. 
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3 We are here interpreting Einsiedel’s use of ‘interactive science model’ as being equivalent 
or nearly equivalent to what we refer to as the contextualist perspective. 
4 The survey uses a multi-stage sampling design and is representative of the UK adult 
population. It was carried out by Social and Community Planning Research and achieved an 
overall response rate of 65 per cent. 
5 While this coefficient is well below the traditional cut-off criterion for scale reliability of 0.7, 
more sophisticated scale assessment using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)  suggests a 
one factor model fits the data extremely well  (X2 = 0.2; df = 1; p= 0.647), with all 4 indicators 
contributing significantly (p < 0.001) to the common factor variance. 
6 The predicted scores assume values of zero on all other independent variables in the 
model. 
7 However, we point such readers in the direction of King, Keohane and Verba (1994) and 
Goldthorpe (2000) for excellent expositions in this regard. 
8 They include as ‘knowledge’ items, statements such as ‘The reward of scientific research is 
recognition rather than money’ and ‘For the industrialized countries investment in science is 
a top priority’ which we consider express unverifiable beliefs that are more indicative of 
attitudes.
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
TABLE 1 OLS Regression Models Predicting General Attitude Toward Science 
Variables in Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant .468*** .453*** .488*** 
 (.028) (.028) (.032) 
Scientific Knowledge .286*** .254*** .176*** 
 (.023) (.024) (.043) 
Favours Labour Party -.012* -.010+ -.009+ 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Age -.001*** -.002*** -.002*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Female -.066*** -.053*** -.052*** 
 (.011) (.012) (.012) 
Attends Church -.058*** -.062*** -.063*** 
 (.014) (.014) (.014) 
Non-manual class .053*** .048*** .047*** 
 (.012) (.012) (.012) 
Science qualification .056*** .050*** .048*** 
 (.014) (.014) (.014) 
Higher Degree .013 .007 .005 
 (.014) (.014) (.014) 
Marital Status -.020+ -.022+ -.021+ 
 (.012) (.012) (.012) 
Employment status .007 .005 .005 
 (.012) (.012) (.012) 
Political Knowledge  .087*** .008 
  (.024) (.043) 
Political * Scientific Knowledge   .158*** 
   (.072) 
R2 .211 .215 .217 
Standard error of the regression .256 .255 .255 
Significance of change in R2    - .005 .002 
F Statistic 61.906*** 57.792*** 53.473***
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
Notes = Standard errors in parentheses. Number of cases = 2328. 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 1996 
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FIGURE 1 Joint Effect of Scientific / Political Knowledge on Attitude toward Science 
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APPENDIX 
 
Wordings and Coding of Items in Attitude toward Science Scale 
 
1. science and technology make life healthier, easier and more comfortable. 
2. we depend too much on science and not enough on faith. 
3. science makes life change too fast. 
4. it is not important for me to know about science in my daily life. 
 
All items are five point Likert response scales ranging from strongly disagree (0) to strongly 
agree (4). 
 
Wordings and Coding of Items in Political Knowledge Scale 
The political knowledge measure is a summed scale of the following six items: 
 
These next questions are about things that different parties are in favour of. If you feel you 
don’t know, just tell me and we’ll go to the next question. Firstly which party would you say 
is… 
1. Most in favour of changing the voting system to a form of proportional representation? 
For the knowledge scale this was recoded: Lib Dems = correct (1), all other answers = 
incorrect (0). 
2. Most in favour of reducing government spending in order to cut taxes? 
For the knowledge scale this was recoded: Tories = correct (1), all other answers = incorrect 
(0). 
3. Most in favour of schools being under local authority control? 
For the knowledge scale this was recoded: Labour = correct (1), all other answers = incorrect 
(0). 
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4. Most in favour of independence for Scotland? 
For the knowledge scale this was recoded: SNP = correct (1), all other answers = incorrect 
(0). 
5. Most in favour of letting private industry run the railways? 
For the knowledge scale this was recoded: Tories = correct (1), all other answers = incorrect 
(0). 
6. Most in favour of setting a minimum wage level, below which no-one can be paid? 
For the knowledge scale this was recoded: Labour = correct (1), all other answers = incorrect 
(0). 
 
 
Wordings and Coding of Items in Scientific Knowledge Scale 
The scientific knowledge measure is a summed scale of the following ten items: 
 
1. Some news stories talk about the results of a ‘scientific study’. When you read or 
hear this term, can you tell me in your own words what you think it means to study something 
scientifically. 
VERBATIM RESPONSES CODED TO: 
1. Theory construction and testing 
2. To undertake tests/experiments 
3. Open-minded, rational in-depth explorations of phenomena/problem to be 
examined. 
4. To measure or classify but no mention of any rigour in process. 
5. Other answers 
8. Don’t know 
9. Refusal/NA 
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For the knowledge scale this was recoded: 1-4 = correct (1), all other answers = 
incorrect (0). 
 
2. Suppose a drug used to treat high blood pressure is suspected of not working well. 
On this card are three different ways scientists might use to investigate this problem. Which 
one do you think scientists would be most likely to use? 
1. Talk to patients to get their opinions 
2. Use their knowledge of medicine to decide how good the drug is 
3. Give the drug to some patients but not to others. Then compare what happens in 
each group. 
8. Don’t know 
9. Refusal/NA 
For the knowledge scale this was recoded: 3 = correct (1), all other answers = 
incorrect (0). 
 
3. Doctors tell a couple that their genetic make-up means that they’ve got a one in 
four chance of having a child with an inherited illness. Does this mean that ?…or 
1. If they have only three children, none will have the illness?…or 
2. If their first child has the illness, the next three will not ?…or 
3. Each of the couple’s children has the same risk of suffering from the illness ?…or 
4. If their first three children are healthy, the fourth will have the illness? 
For the knowledge scale this was recoded: 3 = correct (1), all other answers = 
incorrect (0). 
 
Here is a quick quiz. For each thing I say, tell me if it is true or false. If you don’t 
know, say so and we will skip to the next. 
4. The centre of the earth is very hot. 
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5. Lasers work by focusing sound waves. 
6. Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria. 
 
For the knowledge scale these were recoded: correct (1), all other answers (0). 
 
7. Does the… 
1. earth go round the sun 
2. or the sun go around the earth? 
8. Don’t know 
9. Refusal/DK 
 
For the knowledge scale this was recoded: 1 = correct (1), all other answers = 
incorrect (0). 
 
8. Here is a statement about which people disagree. 
Human beings as we know them today developed from earlier species of animals – 
would you say this was… 
1. Definitely true 
2. Probably true 
3. Probably untrue 
4. or, definitely untrue 
8. Don’t know 
9. Refusal/NA 
 
For the knowledge scale this was recoded: 1 = correct (1), all other answers = 
incorrect (0). 
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9. When scientists use the term DNA, do you think it is to do with the study of… 
1 …stars 
2  rocks, 
3  living things, 
4  or computers? 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refusal/NA 
 
For the knowledge scale this was recoded: 3=correct (1), all other answers = 
incorrect (0). 
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Notes 
1 An earlier version of this article was presented at the World Association of Public Opinion 
Research (WAPOR) Annual Conference, Date, Rome, Italy. 
2 We use this term to denote this perspective because, in this view, knowledge of science is 
seen not as an abstract canon of ‘facts’ but as sets of understandings within varying practical 
and social contexts. The effect of one form of understanding on attitude will, in this view, be 
contextualised by other areas of knowledge. 
3 We are here interpreting Einsiedel’s use of ‘interactive science model’ as being equivalent 
or nearly equivalent to what we refer to as the contextualist perspective. 
4 They include as ‘knowledge’ items, statements such as ‘The reward of scientific research is 
recognition rather than money’ and ‘For the industrialized countries investment in science is 
a top priority’ which we consider express unverifiable beliefs that are more indicative of 
attitudes. 
5 The survey uses a multi-stage sampling design and is representative of the UK adult 
population. It was carried out by Social and Community Planning Research and achieved an 
overall response rate of 65 per cent. 
6 While this coefficient is well below the traditional cut-off criterion for scale reliability of 0.7, 
more sophisticated scale assessment using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)  suggests a 
one factor model fits the data extremely well  (X2 = 0.2; df = 1; p= 0.647), with all 4 indicators 
contributing significantly (p < 0.001) to the common factor variance. 
7 The predicted scores assume values of zero on all other independent variables in the 
model. 
8 However, we point such readers in the direction of King, Keohane and Verba (1994) and 
Goldthorpe (2000) for excellent expositions in this regard. 
